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The Controversial Cormorant: The Second Circuit Defers to Agency
Interpretation
Fund for Animals v. Kempthornel
I. INTRODUCTION
Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne questions whether the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter "FWS") violated United
States treaties and statutes when disseminating a Depredation Order for
double-crested cormorants. 2 Plaintiff, environmental advocacy groups,
alleged that Defendant, federal agencies, violated the Migratory Bird Act,
the Mexico Convention, and the National Environmental Policy Act when
setting forth this Order.3 Defendants contended that each did not violate
these statutes and treaties, but rather set forth a reasonable solution to
problems the double-crested cormorants presented to various business and
recreational activities.4
The Kempthorne court ruled that the agencies in question acted
reasonably considering the facts and circumstances of the Order. In the
end, the Kempthorne court gives agencies extreme deference. Should the
court have exercised more control over the agencies?
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs included animal advocacy groups: The Fund for
Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Defenders of Wildlife, and
' 538 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 Id. The double-crested cormorant is a large black bird with webbed feet and a partly
orange face. Double Crested Cormorant Population,
http://www.epa.gov/med/grosseile-site/indicators/cormorants.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2009). The bird is a water bird, seen most often in the Great Lakes Region. Id It flies
and even swims with only its neck and face out of the water. Id. Generally the
cormorant stands near the shore with its wings spread wide, attempting to catch food. Id.
Its diet includes small lake fish. Id.
3 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 126.
4 Id. at 129.
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Animal Rights Foundation of Florida.5 For some of these organizations,
the double-crested cormorant has long been a source of concern.
Defendants included directors and secretaries of governmental agencies,
such as the FWS.
During the 1970s, the double-crested cormorant population fell
drastically due to DDE causing the birds' eggshells to thin.8 DDE, which
is a product of DDT, created serious issues for the birds' breeding abilities
since most eggs did not hatch.9 Those birds that did hatch experienced
contamination issues, causing a high adult mortality rate among the
birds.' 0 Eventually, after the regulation of DDT, the birds experienced
resurgence in population.' 1 The EPA noted that the bird's resurgence has
been so successful that it has had disastrous impacts on aquaculture.12
After the 1970s, the cormorant population grew so large that
fishermen attributed a decline in fish stocks to the rise in the double-
crested cormorant population.1 3  Complaints especially arose from
Mississippi Delta catfish farms. Fishermen sought ways to limit the
cormorant population.14  The cormorant is regulated by treaties, federal
statutes, and regulations, and is under the responsibility of the FWS, which
5Id. at 124. The Fund for Animals partnered with the Humane Society of the United
States in 2005 to litigate animal cases after creating an Animal Protection Litigation
Section of the Fund for Animals. FundforAnimals.org, Current Fund Docket,
http://fundforanimals.org/courts/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
6 As recently as 1998, Defenders of Wildlife offered a $1000 reward for information
regarding the illegal killing of more than 800 double-crested cormorants off Lake
Ontario. Defenders of Wildlife, $1000 Reward offered for Cormorant Killers (Aug. 5,
1998),
http://www.defenders.org/newsroom/press-releases-folder/1998/08_05_1998_$1,000_re
ward offered for cormorant killers.php?ht--cormorants%20cormorants.
7 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 124.
8 Environmental Protection Agency, Double-crested Cormorant Population Changes
(Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/med/grosseilesite/indicators/cormorants.html (last









regulates migratory birds. 5  Therefore, the fishermen approached the
FWS in order to reach a viable solution to the cormorant problem.
The FWS approved the Aquaculture Depredation Order in 1998,
which allowed the taking of cormorants "when they are found committing
or about to commit acts of depredation on aquaculture stocks, subject to
various conditions and only within thirteen enumerated states."' 6
According to the district court, to take "means to pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."' 7
After enacting the Order, the FWS received even more complaints
about the cormorants, this time involving effects other than aquaculture.' 8
These complaints attributed erosion, destruction of vegetation, "displacing
other bird species, and reducing sport fish populations" to the
cormorants. 19 In response, the FWS passed a Notice of Intent to
promulgate a nationwide plan to control cormorants in 1999.20 That same
year, the FWS also issued an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter
"EIS") and developed a "Cormorant Team" consisting of FWS staff from
several office locations.21
The team created a draft of an EIS, which listed six alternatives for
solving issues stemming from the cormorant population surge.22 These
included: "no action . . . ; only non-lethal management techniques;
expansion of existing cormorant management policies; a new depredation
order; reduction of regional cormorant populations; and frameworks for a
cormorant hunting season." 23 The team recommended the Depredation
Order.24
15 Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2008).
" Id at 128 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 21.47 (2008)).1 7 Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
1 id.




24 Id. The team's goal was increasing "public resource managers. . . flexibility in dealing
with cormorant conflicts while ensuring Federal oversight via reporting and monitoring
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The team proposed that "State, Tribal, and Federal land
management agencies . .. implement a [cormorant] management program,
while maintaining Federal oversight of [cormorant] populations via
reporting and monitoring requirements."25 The proposal also required
agencies to "utilize non-lethal management tools to the extent they
consider[ed] appropriate." 26 The proposed rule required annual reports
from the land management agencies. 2 7 It also reserved the authority of the
FWS to revoke any agency's authority to take the birds if the agency did
not comply with the Order.28
The final Order was published on October 8, 2003 after the EIS
was issued in August of that year. 29 The final order required the initial use
of non-lethal techniques for controlling cormorants.3o It also ordered
measures similar to those found in the control efforts on endangered
requirements." Id. (quoting Notice of Availability; Draft Environmental Impact
Statement on Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,218, 60,218
(Dec. 3, 2001)).
25 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERv., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
DOUBLE-CRESTED CORMORANT MANAGEMENT 17 (2001)).
26 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 25, at 18).
7Id. (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 25, at 19).
28 Id. (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 25, at 19).29 Id. at 130 (citing Notice of Availability; Final Environmental Impact Statement on
Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,603 (Aug. 11, 2003);
Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 68
Fed. Reg. 58,022 (Oct. 8, 2003)). After the draft EIS, the FWS issued a 100-day
comment period, during which it received 994 letters, faxes, and emails, and held ten
public meetings. Fund for Animals v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d 394,402 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Notice of Availability; Final Environmental Impact Statement on Double-Crested
Cormorant Management, 68 Fed. Reg. at 47,603). 32.2% of the communication
supported the new Depredation Order. Id. (citing Notice of Availability; Final
Environmental Impact Statement on Double-Crested Cormorant Management, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 47,603). The FWS eventually redrafted the rule to only include twenty-four
states, including Missouri, rather than forty-eight, identified the agencies to which it
would apply, excluded saltwater, and proposed more methods for taking cormorants. Id.
at 403-04 & n.4 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 21.48 (2008)). After this redrafting, the FWS again
received 10,000 letters, eighty-five percent of which opposed the redraft. Id at 403.
30 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 130 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(d)(1), (d)(7)).
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species under the Endangered Species Act.3 ' Furthermore, under the new
Depredation Order, the agencies have to notify the FWS in the event that a
"single control event" will take more than ten percent of the cormorants in
a "breeding colony." 32
Plaintiffs challenged the Depredation Order on the grounds that it
violates relevant treaties and statutes by 'authoriz[ing] state
fish and wildlife agencies, Indian Tribes, and U.S.
Department of Agriculture . . . employees to kill an
unlimited number of federally protected double-crested
cormorants in New York and twenty-four other States,
without restrictions on time of year or location of the
killings, without any advance notice to the FWS, and
without any showing of specific, localized harm caused by
the cormorants.' 33
Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the FWS violated the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (hereinafter "MBTA") because the Depredation Order did not
require prior permission to take the birds and was too broad.34 Secondly,
Plaintiffs argued that the FWS should have established a close season for
cormorants, because failing to do so violated the Mexico Convention of
1936.3' Thirdly, Plaintiffs argued that the FWS's Depredation Order was
arbitrary and capricious. 36  Finally, Plaintiffs alleged that the Order
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA")
because it did not allow the public to comment on the order nor did it fully
examine the Order's environmental impact.37
Defendants claimed that no treaties or acts were violated, and that
none acted arbitrarily and capriciously when issuing the Depredation
31 Id (citing 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(d)(8)).
32 Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(d)(9)(i)).
33 Id. at 126 (alterations in original) (quoting Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief 11, Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124 (No. 104CV00959)).
34 Id. at 132.
3 1 d at 134.
36 Id. at 135.
37Id. at 137.
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Order. Defendants answered Plaintiffs' arguments by maintaining that the
authorization was specific and that the Mexico Convention did not require
that the FWS give prior permission to take the birds.3 8  Secondly,
Defendants alleged that the MBTA does not require a close season for the
cormorants. 39 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed Plaintiffs' case after all parties moved for
summary judgment in the trial court.40 The district court found that the
Order did not violate the MBTA because it is specific as to the extent and
the means of taking the birds. 4 1 The trial court further found that the
delegation to other agencies did not violate the MBTA because the
delegation did not grant "free reign" nor abdicate its authority to the
agencies.42 Finally, the court found that the Order did not violate the
Mexico Convention because the provision requiring a "close season" only
applied to Aame birds, and both parties agree that the cormorant is not a
game bird.
The Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York's
decision, holding that the Depredation Order does not violate the MBTA
or treaties, the FWS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting
this order, and the FWS complied with NEPA when it adopted the
Order.4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutes and Treaties
In the early twentieth century, the United States and nations within
its close proximity experienced difficulty regulating the populations of
migratory birds that crossed national borders since there was no consistent
38 See id. at 134.
3 see id.
40 Id. at 126.
41 Id. at 131 (citing Fund for Animals v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
42 Id. (quoting Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11).
43 Id. (citing Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 412-14).
4 Id. at 134, 137.
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regulation system among the countries. 4 5 As a result, the United States,
Mexico, the United Kingdom (on behalf of Canada), the Soviet Union, and
Japan executed treaties that regulated migratory birds.46 These treaties
regulated the hunting and taking of migratory birds that often crossed
international boundaries. 47
The Mexico Convention is a treaty formed between the United
States and Mexico in 1937.48 This treaty is the only United States treaty
that refers specifically to cormorants. 49 This treaty requires the United
States to establish "close seasons," or seasons of the year during which it
is prohibited to take migratory birds.50
The MBTA is the statutory result of these treaties.51 The Act's
purpose is to protect migratory birds by creating a uniform regulation
system for their taking and killing migratory birds. 52  The MBTA
prohibits the killing of migratory birds without permission from the
Secretary of the Interior.5 3  The statute notes that the Secretary of the
Interior may establish when, how, and to what extent migratory birds may
be taken, or killed. The statute, however, does not indicate whether the
Secretary may delegate this authority to a third party or agency.
451Id at 125.
4 6 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006).
47 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
48 Convention Between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter
The Mexico Convention].
49 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 134.
so The Mexico Convention, supra note 48, art. II(A) ("The high contracting parties agree
to establish laws, regulations and provisions to satisfy the need set forth in the preceding
Article, including ... [t]he establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit in certain
periods of the year the taking of migratory birds, their nests or eggs, as well as their
transportation or sale, alive or dead, their products or parts, except when proceeding, with
appropriate authorization, from private game farms or when used for scientific purposes,
for propagation or for museums.").
5 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).52 d
" Id. § 704(a).
4 Id.
5s Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Migratory birds are further protected by NEPA, an Act that
dictates procedural rather than substantive areas of environmental law.56
The purpose of NEPA is to create a deliberative process before
promulgating new regulations affecting the environment, which results in
greater protection of animals. NEPA requires agencies to consider
interdisciplinary studies, create a systematic procedure, and enerate
reports detailing environmental impacts when making decisions. This
gives the public and other interested parties time to communicate issues to
the agency and also holds agencies more accountable for decisions that
affect wildlife.59 Courts must determine whether agency decisions
comply with NEPA.60
B. Agency Authority and Judicial Review
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, courts may
overturn an agency decision when it is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to
a constitutional right, in excess of a statutory right, without observance of
procedure required by law,6 1 unsupported by substantial evidence, or
56See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006).
5 See id.
51Id. § 4332(A).
s See id § 4332.
60 See id.
61 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to comply with
the National Environmental Policy Act, which outlines procedures used by agencies
when making decisions that impact the environment. Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne,
538 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2008); see also National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370h. The NEPA requires agencies to submit Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS) "on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The
recommended format for an EIS includes the "[p]urpose of and need for action,"
"[a]lternatives including proposed action," the "[a]ffected environment," and
"[e]nvironmental consequences." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10(d)-(g) (2008). The purpose of the
EIS is to "insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act [NEPA] are infused into
the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government." Id. § 1502.1.
Furthermore, "it shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental
impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives
181
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unwarranted by the facts. 62  In general, an agency decision that is
reasonable will usually stand.63 The Administrative Procedure Act
granted great power to agencies, " which seems reasonable because if
agency decisions were simply overturned by courts, the power and
expertise of the agency would be wasted. Courts neither have the time nor
resources to research specific issues to the extent that agencies can.
Therefore, agency authority is an integral part of the American
governmental system. 65
When reviewing agency decisions, a court must give deference to
other branches and not overstep its bounds.6 6  If the court exercises too
which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human
environment." Id
62 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(F).
63 Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1990).
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
65 Not only does this case involve the separation of the judicial and the executive
branches, it also involves a grant of authority from the legislative branch to the executive
branch. Congress granted the Secretary of the Interior the authority to fill in the gaps left
in the MBTA. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 132. Because of this, the court must carefully
consider whether the agency effectively utilized its given power. Therefore, the court
must determine with what standards it may review the agency decision.
66
The Secretary of the Interior has a liberal reach of authority. Fund for Animals
v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d
317, 322 (4th Cir. 1942)). After the migratory bird treaties were signed, Congress gave
the Secretary of the Interior authority to draft regulations. Id These regulations
determined when and how many migratory birds could be taken or killed. Id.
More issues arise when agencies delegate authority to other entities. The
Kempthorne court relied on two particular cases to glean the definition of "delegation."
The first is United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This
case gave three rules for delegation of authority: the first being that an agency can
"condition its grant of permission on the decision of another entity" as long as there "is a
reasonable connection between the outside entity's decision and the federal agency's
determination." Id. at 567. The second is that the agency may use an "outside entity" to
provide the agency with factual information. Id Finally, the agency may turn to the
outside source for "advice and policy recommendations, provided the agency makes the
final decision itself." Id at 568.
The United States Telecom court also held that "[a]n agency delegates its
authority when it shifts to another party 'almost the entire determination of whether a
182
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much power, it would disrupt the separation of powers system that has
long been the roots of American government. In the 2001 Supreme Court
case United States v. Mead Corp., the Court noted that "[w]hen Congress
has 'explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation,' and any ensuing regulation is binding in the
courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance,
or manifestly contrary to the statute." 67
Courts utilize the "arbitrary and capricious" standard developed in
the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council when determining whether agency
interpretation of a statute is reasonable.6 8  Before going through the
traditional Chevron analysis, however, a court must first consider the
"Chevron Step Zero." 69 The purpose of this step is to determine whether
the Chevron analysis is even appropriate in the case at hand:
[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
specific statutory requirement ... has been satisfied."' Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 133
(omission in original) (quoting U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567). Furthermore, "[a]gencies
may seek advice and policy recommendations from outside parties, but they may not
'rubber-stamp' decisions made by others under the guise of seeking their 'advice."' Id
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting US. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 568).
The Kempthorne court also considered the case National Park & Conservation
Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999). In that case, Plaintiffs challenged a
delegation by the National Park Service to private entities. Id. at 9. The National Park
court focused more on the "final reviewing authority" and stated that the key delegation
test is whether an agency "retained sufficient final reviewing authority" over the action.
Id. at 19.
Agencies must be careful when delegating their great authority because courts
give great deference to agency decisions. Therefore, once an agency botches a decision it
will probably stand since courts afford such deference to agency decisions.
67 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
68 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
69 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation ofJudicial Decisionmaking, Statutory




that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may
be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
70intent.
After determining that Chevron is appropriate, a court considers two steps
under the Chevron analysis: first, "whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue," and secondly, if the intent of Congress is
not clear, the court must inquire as to whether the "agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."7
When courts review agency interpretations of treaties, "[r]espect is
ordinarily due [to] the reasonable views of the executive branch
concerning the meaning of an international treaty., 72 However, Chevron
can also be used to analyze the agency interpretation of the Mexico
Convention.73 This provides courts with a way to check the agency action
on a treaty.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Second Circuit split its decision into four issues.74 The first
was whether the Depredation Order violated the MBTA. 7 5 The second
was whether the Order violated treaties to which the United States is a
party.76 The third was whether the FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously
7 0 Id. at 776-77 (alteration in original) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27).
n1 Id at 772 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
72 Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 134 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999)).
7 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 28-31, Kempthorne, 538 U.S. 124 (No. 05-2603-
cv).
74 See Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 132-38.
75 Id at 132.7 1Id at 134.
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in promulgating the Order.n Finally, the court considered whether the
FWS violated the NEPA.
A. Violation of the MBTA
Plaintiffs argued that the Order violated the MBTA because
according to the MBTA, the takings must be specifically authorized by the
FWS. 79 The Second Circuit held that the Order does not violate the
MBTA because the Order still requires significant oversight by the FWS
over the takings.8 0
The court noted that delegation by an agency to private individuals
or organizations is often very troublesome.8 1 These private entities may
take too many animals and may not account for its actions, creating an
issue with the democratic decision-making process of the agencies.82 The
court also noted that outside parties may not share the same concerns as
the agency and take their agenda too far. 83 Furthermore, the MBTA did
not specifically authorize the delegation of taking powers. 84
Because the MBTA did not specifically authorize delegation, the
court considered the definition of "delegation" and then determined
whether the FWS impermissibly delegated this power to a third party.85
The court noted that delegation occurs when an agency shifts the
responsibility of determining whether a "specific statutory requirement has
been satisfied" to another party.8 6 The court gleaned its definition from
" Id. at 135.







5 Id. at 132-33.
86 Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359
F.3d 554, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
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National Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, a D.C. Circuit case from
1999.87
The court used this definition to determine that the Order only
permits a "grant of permission," not a "delegation of authority," since
there are restrictions on the takings. First of all, the other parties may
only take cormorants. 89  Secondly, they may only take those birds to
"prevent depredations on the public resources of fish . . . , wildlife, plants,
and their habitats." 90 The court emphasized that the taking restrictions are
so great that the restrictions constitute permission to carry out a decision
by the FWS, not a delegation of decision-making authority. 9 1
B. Whether the Order Complies with Treaties
Next, the court considered whether the Depredation Order
conflicted with treaties to which the United States is a party because the
Order failed to establish close seasons for the takings, which may be
required by the Mexico Convention. 92  The court noted that the
Convention is ambiguous as to whether close seasons need to be
established for all migratory birds or only game birds. 93
The sections in the Convention read that there should be close
seasons when taking "migratory birds," not "all migratory birds," a point
on which the court focused much of its analysis. 94  Furthermore, the
Convention created an exception for private game farms and noted that
close seasons are when "hunting" would be limited. 95 These clues led the
court to conclude that a close season is not required by the Convention.
87 id.
8 8Id. (citing U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567).89 id.
9 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 50 C.F.R. §
21.48(c) (2008)).
91 Id. (citing U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567).
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The court based its final decision on the fact that it is required to
defer to the executive branch when interpreting a treaty. 96 When two
interpretations present themselves to a court, the court should defer to the
executive branch's interpretation. 97 Since the FWS's interpretation of the
treaty is reasonable in light of the ambiguity of the Convention, the court
noted that it must defer to the agency's interpretation.98
C. Whether the FWS Acted Arbitrarily or Capriciously
The court next considered whether the FWS acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in adopting the Depredation Order.99
First, the court held that the Order is a rational solution to the
problems associated with cormorants. 00 The court cited State Farm,
which explained the rule that for an order not to be arbitrary or capricious,
there must be a "rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."' 0 The court held that since the Order provides many
restrictions on the taking of cormorants, it is not arbitrary or capricious.' 02
Secondly, the court held that the Order is a reasonable response to
the harm caused by the cormorants.1 03 It reasoned that even though the
harm caused by the cormorants is site-specific and the FWS has
acknowledged that it could use more information regarding the
cormorants' effect on local habitats, the Order is specific and detailed
enough to be reasonable.'04 Not only does it only pertain to affected
states, it also allows takings only when the cormorant is "committing or
9 6 Id. (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999)).
9 See id. at 134-35.
9 Id. at 135.
9 Id.
1 Id.
' Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)).
102 Id.




about to commit . . . depredations."' 05 Furthermore, the takings must be
annually recorded.106
Thirdly, Plaintiffs suggested an alternative solution to the problem:
that the FWS should have adopted a "less drastic liberalized permitting
scheme."' 0 7 However, again, the court reasoned that when there are two
or more solutions to a problem, courts should defer to the executive
branch. 08 Since the FWS's Order is reasonable, the court deferred to its
solution. 109
D. Whether the Order Violates the NEPA
Finally, Plaintiffs asserted that the FWS violated the NEPA when
it adopted the Order. The NEPA is a series of statutes that requires
agencies to adopt an EIS that "informs decisionmakers" about the
environmental impacts of the Order. 1l This EIS should be site-specific
when applicable and provide a very critical analysis of the environmental
impacts of the Order. 1 Plaintiffs alleged that the FWS did not conduct a
thorough investigation because it failed to delve into site-specific effects
of the Order on the environment. 112 The court reasoned that the FWS is
not obligated to enter into "endless hypothesizing as to remote
possibilities."'3
The court held that since the Order allows local entities to take the
birds, but does not require the entity to do so, there is no way of knowing




107 Id. (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 49, Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124 (No. 05-
2603-cv)).
o8 d at 136-37 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971)).
Id. at 137.
10 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2008)).
1" Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1).
112 id.
'
13 Id (quoting County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379 (2d Cir.
1977)).
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where the takings would occur and thus agencies could not possibly
determine the environmental impacts of the takings.114 Therefore, since
there is no certain site-specific action, the FWS only had to prepare a
"programmatic EIS," which it did."'
V. COMMENT
The Kempthorne court held that the agency decisions were
reasonable.116 However, the analysis that the court used should have been
more thorough. The court overly deferred to the agency when determining
whether the agency violated the Mexico Convention of 1936.
Furthermore, the court failed to properly analyze the agency's actions
using the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
This decision results in great deference to the agencies in question.
One must ask whether judicial agency deference is a good policy. Should
justices exercise judicial power to the extent that they influence or serve as
a police-like check over agencies? Or should the judicial branch give
extreme deference to agency decisions?
In this case, the court gave extreme deference to the agency, in one
instance disregarding plain language of a treaty and in another instance not
114 Id. at 137-38.
's Id. at 138.
11 Id. It is perhaps interesting to note that the first named defendant, Dirk Kempthorne,
appointed as Secretary of the Interior by former President George W. Bush, was known
for a "voting record on environmental issues in the Senate, saying he had almost always
favored changing laws like the Endangered Species Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act
to make them more favorable to commercial interests." Michael Janofsky, Idaho
Governor Selected to Lead Interior Dept., N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 2008, at A 16, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/politics/17interior.html. Kempthorne is
notorious among animal advocacy groups because during his tenure, he put fewer species
on the endangered species list than any other Secretary of the Interior in history. Press
Release, E-Wire, Kempthome Wins 2007 Rubber Dodo Award: Protects Fewer Species




performing a Supreme Court test when needed. This resulted in excessive
deference to the point of setting an untidy precedent." 7
The court's interpretation of the Mexico Convention was
unreasonable. The court stated, "we think that the Mexico Convention
itself is ambiguous regarding the question of whether the 'close seasons'
requirement applies to all migratory birds."" 8 However, the Convention
is not ambiguous. When determining the meaning of a treaty, one must
"first look to its terms to determine its meaning."ll 9
The meaning of the convention is unambiguous. The title of the
Convention is "Convention Between The United States Of America And
The United Mexican States For The Protection Of Migratory Birds And
Game Mammals."l 20 The treaty does not differentiate between game and
non-game migratory birds until Article IV, in which it states, "[t]he.high
contracting parties declare that for the purposes of the present Convention
the following birds shall be considered migratory: Migratory Game Birds.
Migratory Non-Game Birds."'21
The Convention states that all game birds and non-game birds
listed are considered to be "migratory," the convention refers to
"migratory" birds, and the Convention's purpose is to protect "migratory"
birds. Since the word "migratory" continuously refers to both game birds
and non-game birds in all provisions of the Convention, one can safely
assume that the close season requirement does as well.122 The drafters of
the Convention were clear.
117 However, this may have been a strategic move, as courts should not overstep
constitutional bounds when reviewing agency decisions.
'
1 8 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 134.
119 United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 570 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992)).
120 The Mexico Convention, supra note 48.
121 Id. art. IV.
122 The Mexico Convention's text requiring close seasons:
The establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit in certain
periods of the year the taking of migratory birds, their nests or eggs, as
well as their transportation or sale, alive or dead, their products or parts,
except when proceeding, with appropriate authorization, from private
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The result was that the court deferred too much to the agency's
decision. Agencies deserve much deference in decision-making because
each possesses the time, talent, and resources to fully research upcoming
rules and decisions. However, agencies do not deserve so much deference
that decisions become unreasonable. The Kempthorne court afforded so
much deference to the FWS that future agencies could theoretically argue
that any statute is unclear in order to make the agency interpretation seem
more reasonable. A court cannot defer to an agency when the agency's
interpretation of a statute is so attenuated from a reasonable interpretation
that it stretches the imagination to think of how the agency could have
possibly interpreted the rule in such a fashion.
Furthermore, even though Plaintiffs alleged that the decision was
arbitrary or capricious, the court did not adequately work through the
Chevron analysis; the Supreme Court-promulgated analysis for
determining whether an agency interpretation of a statute is reasonable.
According to Defendants, the court "is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency." 23 Furthermore, Defendants argued that
"the court need only be 'satisfied that the agency examined the relevant
data and established a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."' 24 The Kempthorne court merely determined that there
was substantial evidence to support the agency decisions, not that the
action was in fact reasonable in accordance with the Chevron standard.
The court ended its inquiry after determining that there was sufficient
evidence that the cormorant was hindering other species and habitats and
that the Depredation Order was one of many possible responses to the
problem. 125 Therefore, rather than focusing on the reasonableness of this
game farms or when used for scientific purposes, for propagation or for
museums.
Id. art. II.
123 Page Proof Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 28, Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne,
538 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 05-2603-cv) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
124 Id. (quoting Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000)).
125 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 137.
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measure, the court focused on the substantial evidence supporting the
FWS's action.126
However, the court should have utilized Chevron. The Chevron
analysis should be used when, like in this case, an agency's interpretation
of a statute is at issue. Plaintiffs argued that the FWS's interpretation of
the word delegation was amiss.127 Furthermore, Plaintiffs argued that the
FWS should not have interpreted the MBTA in such a way as to give the
FWS the power to issue such a Depredation Order.128 Therefore, the
situation calls for the Chevron analysis.
Next, the court should have considered the two Chevron steps.
First, the court should have considered "whether Congress [had] directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."l 2 9  In this case, it had not.
Congress had expressly delegated the authority to determine what birds or
animals needed to be taken to agencies. Secondly, the court should have
considered whether the "agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."' 0 If so, the court must defer to the agency's
decision.' ' However, once an agency decision reaches step two, it is
extremely rare that a court will overturn it.132
Sometimes the many tests courts may use to determine whether an
agency's actions were valid seem daunting. 33 However, the Second
126 See id. at 135. It is unclear why the Kempthorne court utilizes the State Farm case in
its analysis rather than the Chevron test. See id. The District Court utilized the Chevron
test in its analysis. Fund for Animals v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 2d 394,408 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
127 Kempthorne, 538 F.3d at 135.
128Id
129 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
130Id at 843.
131 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation ofJudicial Decisionmaking, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
767, 774 (2008).132 Id at 775.
133
The law governing judicial deference to agency statutory constructions
is a ghastly brew of improbable fictions and proceduralism. One
reason this state of affairs persists is that courts have failed to resolve a
contradiction between two competing, sensible impulses in deference
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Circuit's opinion fails to bring clarity to the confusion. The Second
Circuit had the opportunity to methodically engage in a clear analysis
under the Administrative Procedure Act, but failed to do so. Courts
should always attempt to engage in the tightest procedures possible to
achieve the fairest result, if only for the reason that the failure to do so
may create incorrect precedent. Therefore, this new Second Circuit
precedent may change the outcome of future cases, and the potential
effects could be dismal.134
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kempthorne court overly deferred to the FWS's decision not
to establish close seasons for the taking of cormorants and failed to
consider all relevant tests under the Administrative Procedure Act when
determining that the agency's actions were valid. The court should have
conducted the Chevron test to determine whether, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, the FWS acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
releasing the Depredation Order. The court did not engage in this test
despite the fact that Plaintiffs alleged that the Order violated the MBTA.
In the future, courts should be more diligent in determining the
proper tests and standards of review because other administrative law
doctrine. Oceans of precedent over the last 150 years have stressed that
courts should defer to longstanding, reasonable constructions by
agencies of statutes they administer. Then along came Chevron, which
extolled agency flexibility and instructed courts to extend strong
deference even to interpretive flip-flops. Competition between the
virtues of interpretive consistency and flexibility has bubbled through
and confused judicial deference analysis ever since. The Supreme
Court's recent efforts to limit the scope of Chevron's strong deference
to those agency constructions carrying the "force of law" has worsened
such confusion, in part because the Court's discussion and application
of this concept were incoherent.
Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force ofLaw, 66
OHIO STATE L.J. 1013, 1013 (2005).
134 In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, the court noted that a court cannot simply "rubber-stamp
agency decisions as correct." 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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courts subsequently use the tests to promulgate new opinions. Since the
Administrative Procedure Act gives courts direction about how and under
what circumstances courts may overturn agency decisions, and case law
further clarifies these rules, courts should take care to closely follow these
guidelines. Furthermore, courts should not grant agencies unlimited
deference. Courts often defer to agencies' interpretations, citing
separation of powers for support. However, courts should not allow
agencies to essentially write laws by granting all agency interpretations
extreme deference.
While this case's subject may not seem groundbreaking, the
double-crested cormorant's day in court resulted in a perfect example of a
court's failing to engage in the most thorough judicial standards of review
when considering agency decisions. Legal scholars cite Chevron as the
beginning of the decrease of judicial deference to agencies, but this court
works around that analysis to defer to the agency. Therefore, lawyers
and judges alike should more closely consider this case in debates
regarding agency deference and decision-making. Courts and lawyers
must ponder: is a high level of deference a bad policy?
ABBIE HESSE ROTHERMICH
135 "No longer is every agency interpretation assumed to be worthy of deference. Instead,
a court must first perform a 'step zero' analysis to determine if Chevron applies." Torrey
A. Cope, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Jurisdiction After Mead, 78 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1327, 1338 (2005).
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